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Abstract:  The concept of policy learning has been attracting increasing attention in the 
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Coordination (OMC). However, much research faces fundamental methodological problems 
regarding the mode of functioning and extent of policy learning. This paper shows that these 
problems can be avoided if we take a closer look at the potential of the OMC instruments to 
stimulate learning. The paper differentiates between three types of learning: learning by own 
experience, learning from others and learning with others. Systematic links are established 
between them and the learning conditions created by the European Employment Strategy 
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there is a fundamental contradiction between actor orientation in deliberative policy learning 
and competitive policy bargaining which questions the learning potential of the EES. 
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1. Introduction   
In recent years, both scholars and practitioners have shown increasing interest in policy 
learning and related concepts like policy transfer and policy diffusion. This can be attributed 
not least to European integration, which has seen the establishment of the Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC), a mode of governance based on the assumption of mutual policy 
learning. There are hopes that this instrument can stimulate policy learning, bringing positive 
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limitations. Against this backdrop, I examine the OMC with an eye to what characteristics of 
the instruments it deploys can in fact stimulate and guide policy learning. I am thus concerned 
with the effectiveness of OMC in promoting policy learning, not with its factual effect in the 
member states.  
The OMC finds application in a number of policy areas. Despite differences in process and 
modalities, OMCs in all policy areas share a conviction that member states should learn from 
one another through iterative reporting, benchmarking, and peer review in the pursuit of 
common policy goals. The toolbox provided by the European Employment Strategy (EES) is 
older and better developed than OMC instruments in other policy areas; it is therefore 
particularly useful to take a closer look at it (also Niechoj, Radulova, López-Santana and 
Weishaupt this issue). It is likely that the design and processual use of the instruments 
stimulate various forms of learning (vs. Pfister this issue). But they possibly also stimulate 
other transfer mechanisms. This is of practical and theoretical importance. On the one hand, 
differentiation into various forms of learning allows systematic comparison of the learning 
potential offered by EES instruments. On the other hand, it is important to investigate 
interaction between instruments and their compatibility. Corresponding instruments may 
reinforce each other and lead to more comprehensive learning effects. At the same time, even 
if certain instruments have the potential to stimulate learning, if they are used at cross purposes 
to other tools this could reduce or neutralise the learning potential of EES as a whole.  
The aim of the article is to contribute to understanding learning as a causal mechanism and 
thus to a better appreciation of the learning potential of the OMC.  
z I begin by outlining different learning concepts discussed in the research literature 
(section 2).  
z I continue with a critical summary of research findings on policy learning in the context 
of the OMC and discuss the methodological problems involved (section 3).  
z Finally, conducting my own analysis of learning in the EES framework that departs 
from the instruments, I show that their steering potential consists only to a limited extent 
in stimulating or initiating policy learning. Moreover, the fundamental idea of the 
steering function of deliberative learning processes runs counter to increasing 
differentiation in the form of more concrete targets and the associated policy conflicts 
(section 4).  
z I finish by summarizing findings and discussing possible recommendations on 
expanding the potential for learning by modifying existing instruments (section 5).  
2. Different forms of learning   
This section provides a basis for empirical analysis by considering forms of learning and the 
underlying conditions for learning. With reference to the much quoted definition by Heclo 
(1974), I understand learning for my present purposes to be an alteration in the behaviour or 
preference of a rational actor (in our case a government) in reaction to a modified information 
pool (in this case the EES). The information pool is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
change through learning. By making a selection of experience and data out of the information 
pool, by filtering and interpreting, the actor generates new knowledge. This knowledge forms 
the basis for her decisions.  
As far as the depth of learning processes is concerned, the most important distinction is 
whether actors’ strategies for action and steering instruments alter because the information 
pool has changed with respect to the possibilities and contexts of problem solving, or whether 
actors also learn with regard to their preferences. If actors seek effectively to attain a constant 
goal the process is referred to as “single loop learning” (Argyris and Schön 1996: 20) or 
“simple learning” (Deutsch 1969: 146-147); adaptation of existing instruments is called “first 
order change”, and the introduction of an instrument designed to attain an existing goal 
“second order change” (Hall 1993: 279). In the case of “complex learning” (Deutsch 1969: 
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change their preferences on the basis of new cost-benefit considerations (updating beliefs). 
Here Argyris und Schön (1996: 20-22) refer to “double-loop learning”; Hall (1993: 279) to 
“third order change” in policy goals or the policy paradigm.  
A change in the information pool is necessary for both simple and complex policy learning. It 
can be generated in various contexts (see Visser and Hemerijck 2001) (1): First, the most 
everyday form of learning is expanding the information pool through one’s own experience. 
This form of learning can be fostered by focused inducement to learn in the sense of reflexive 
evaluation or support in the search for information on the context of problems. But decisions 
need not be based on an actor’s own experience. Second, if governments use information on
the effects of policy decisions and on the policy instruments of other countries without 
experiencing them themselves, they can learn from others (“lesson-drawing”, Rose 1991). On 
the assumption that rational actors seek solutions to problems, this allows transaction costs to 
be reduced (“learning ahead of failure”, Visser and Hemerijck 2001). Who learns from whom 
depends on a number of factors such as the pull of successful or the push of powerful 
countries, geographical distance, similar problems or functional interdependencies (Trubek and 
Trubek 2005: 93; Rose 1991: 14-17). Third, deliberative, experimental processes seek to 
generate new, innovative and better solutions to problems on the basis of voluntary exchange 
of information and positions in decisional situations. The approach proceeds on the assumption 
that frequent interaction can alter the preferences of member states and thus enable joint 
decisions to be taken (2). The concept of deliberative learning was developed with the aim of 
preventing bottle-necks in production and optimising processes at the plant level. By 
exchanging information, actors are able to check and adjust their own decisions with regard to 
anticipated changes in the behaviour of other actors (Sabel 1994: 158). This school of thought 
argues that these considerations can be transferred from business practice to governmental 
action (“democratic experimentalism”, e.g. Dorf and Sabel 1998). Consulting, 
experimentation, the exchange and pooling of information enlarge the scope for action and 
enable policy learning in the sense of pursuing common goals.  
Steering instruments that improve the general conditions for generating and exchanging 
information between governments can foster learning processes (e.g. Sabatier 1986: 323). In 
contrast, no learning from others is to be expected if actors are called upon to defend 
(competing) or not easily incompatible (national) interests. If the institutional context increases 
competition between actors, confrontation or bargaining are more likely than joint learning or 
problem solving. Scharpf (1997: 124) describes the difference between the two forms of 
interaction as follows:  
“The successful joint search for better overall solutions requires creativity, 
effective communication, and mutual trust, whereas success in the distributive 
battle depends on the strategic and even opportunistic, communication and 
withholding of available information […] the ‘cooperative’ interaction 
orientation that is conducive to joint learning in the production dimension is 
psychologically incompatible with the “competitive” orientation that facilitates 
success in distribution […]”.  
In principle competitive settings still allow for “reactive learning [where] governments learn 
individually by responding to the challenges of the competition” (Benz 2007: 512). Yet this 
form of positive competition in the market of political ideas is exigent institutionally and 
“there is only limited evidence that, in practice, policy competition does play a significant
role” (Benz 2007: 513). The following analysis of instruments and their operational 
mechanisms imply that the learning potential of the EES is rather determined by the dichotomy 
of competitive bargaining versus deliberative exchange and learning.  
3. EES performance monitoring and related conceptual problems   
Policy learning is not an end in itself, it serves to implement political programmes or in general 
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policy learning. However, many of the studies on the subject suffer from major conceptual 
problems, which make conclusions about policy learning in the EES context more difficult 
(see Kröger this issue). Strictly speaking, a critical consideration of the research literature on 
the OMC reveals no more than that changes have been taking place in member states. And we 
know that there is a mode of governance at the European level that allegedly prompts or 
facilitates learning processes. To associate these two observations under the heading “learning 
process” is unsatisfying for three reasons.  
1. The problem of lacking empirical evidence: Many (particularly early) studies turn to official 
documents in evaluating learning in the EES context. They take no account of the fact that 
these documents are not neutral assessments but reports prepared or at least approved by the 
national governments in question (e.g. Biagi 2000: 156; Mosher and Trubek 2003: 75). No 
check is made on whether a selective presentation of national policies (deliberately) 
overestimates or underestimates the influence of the OMC. Nor does this approach ensure 
comparability between countries. More recent studies comparing a larger number of member 
states can better cope with this problem (Zeitlin et al. 2005: 27-28). But even a great deal of 
empirical effort cannot eliminate difficulties in adequately measuring learning processes.  
2. The problem of alternative explanatory variables: New policies can be introduced without 
the EES playing a role (Scharpf 2002: 654). Over and beyond the empirical questions on how 
various explanatory factors are to be weighted, here my criticism is levelled at the analytical 
negligence of alternative explanatory factors in identifying learning processes.  
Figure 1 
Very few studies conceptualise external factors (e.g., international financial crises) and internal 
factors (e.g., demographic change) as counter-factual explanations. Policy learning in the EES 
cannot be distinguished from other causes of policy change. Where different countries find 
similar solutions to common external or internal problems, this can result in policy change or 
even in convergence. Moreover, there are international organisations other than the EU with an 
interest in steering employment policy, such as the ILO and OECD (Schäfer 2005), equally 
causing (potential) policy change.  
3. The problem of functionally equivalent transfer mechanisms: The third point of criticism is 
the underspecification of the mechanism underlying the change to be observed. In most studies 
on the OMC, the relationship between EES and change in national policies resembles a black 
box. 
Figure 2 
Many studies on the OMC assume implicitly or explicitly that the transfer mechanism in the 
‘black box’ is learning (see López-Santana this issue, Vanhercke this issue). “Its [OMC] real 
effectiveness and influence nationally is part of a collective learning process” (De La Porte and 
Pochet 2002a: 13). Or “it organises a learning process in order to promote the exchange of
experience and best practice” (Regent 2003: 191). Although assessment of learning processes
in the OMC has become more sceptical over time, there is still a lack of systematic in-depth 
analysis showing that observable policy changes are due to learning by actors or the overall 
political system.  
What is more, other transfer mechanisms can be posited for the EES. One important such 
mechanism is pressure. The OMC is described as a soft steering instrument because actors
have no possibility for imposing direct sanctions. Ashiagbor (2004: 314 and 327) claims that 
learning processes can be initiated by exerting pressure (naming and shaming). However, I 
argue that changes in national employment policies driven by this logic must be fundamentally 
distinguished from learning, since any change is not brought about by alteration of the 
information pool.  
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Change in employment policy through national government political strategies (typically 
motivated by economic or political interests) also differs from the transfer of European policies 
through learning. Soft European tools like the OMC may also be used by national actors for 
their “leverage effect” (Erhel et al. 2005) or as “selective amplifiers” (Visser 2005) for 
advancing specifically national interests. In such cases the OMC is a means to an end but not 
the factor that activates learning processes (see Weishaupt this issue).  
A careful research design is needed to obtain an empirically clear distinction between political 
calculation, coercion, learning, and other transfer mechanisms such as imitation or copying. Of 
central importance is the precise analysis of government motives for action and the question 
whether changes in behaviour or preferences are subsequent to a change in the information 
pool. It comes as no surprise that the country chapters in Zeitlin et al.(2005) reach diverging 
conclusions on different transfer mechanisms. Since the individual articles do not 
systematically examine potential transfer mechanisms, it remains unclear whether this 
divergence points to country-specific differences or whether the applied research perspective is 
to blame.  
Finally, another analytic-conceptual difficulty arises in the European multi-level system. The 
EES often reflects national policies, for what is taken to be Brussels policy is the result of 
negotiations between members states and European institutions. This is the case for the 
creation of the EES (Schäfer 2004) as well as for the elaboration of goals, guidelines, and 
indicators (De La Porte and Pochet 2002b; Jobelius 2003). The distinction between what is to 
be learned and what has already been learned tends to blur.  
This paper is also unable to resolve many of the conceptual problems mentioned. But it points 
to a possibility for addressing the issue of policy learning in the EES in an alternative manner 
by examining the potential of steering instruments for stimulating learning.  
4. The potential of EES instruments for stimulating learning   
The EES consists of a number of instruments and processes that are repeated in regular cycles. 
The Council adopts Employment Guidelines and country-specific Recommendations (since 
2005 part of the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs). On this basis member states draw 
up National Reform Programmes (NRPs; prior to 2005 National Action Plans – NAPs) which 
are assessed by the European Commission and the Council through the Joint Employment 
Report with a view to setting the next annual guidelines (3). Apart from the NRPs, additional 
indicators help in collecting information and comparing countries. Then the process starts over 
again. In parallel, peer reviews seek to identify exemplary procedures and to encourage their 
transfer to other countries through meetings and exchanges. The institutional design and 
processual deployment of these EES instruments determine what forms of learning are 
probable, or what other transfer mechanisms come into play. Does the given instrument satisfy 
the structural and procedural preconditions for stimulating policy learning to achieve the 
practical realisation of EES employment policy goals? If the nature of the instrument presents 
a major obstacle to learning, policy learning is unlikely to take place through the EES (4). 
The following table assigns EES tools to one of the three analytically distinct forms of learning 
– for reasons of clarity, it shows the dominating form; further combinations and 
complementarities are discussed in the paper.  
Table 1 
It should be emphasised that the table makes no statement about actual learning processes or 
the relevance of learning as compared with other transfer mechanisms. After all, even in the 
best of cases, learning is not a sufficient condition for successful steering by the EES.  
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Guidelines are proposed by the European Commission and adopted by the Council acting by a 
qualified majority. They set common priorities for European employment policy. Since 2005, 
they have applied for a period of three years (previously one year) and are integrated into 
European economic policy guidelines. The eight guidelines are subsumed under three 
priorities, which are concerned with both policies and outcomes:  
1. attract and retain more people in employment, increase labour supply and modernise 
social protection systems,  
2. improve adaptability of workers and enterprises and  
3. increase investment in human capital through better education and skills.  
The guidelines are supplemented by country-specific recommendations (in 2008 between 5 
and 6 per country).  
The relatively great potential of guidelines and recommendations for promoting learning 
consists in encouraging the interlinkage of known problems, generating information, and 
reassessing existing policies. Policy learning would then take place through inducement to 
expand one’s own experience. Limits are that country-specific recommendations are in 
practice – with the exception of external studies or EES indicators (see 4.5) – largely based on 
reports prepared by national governments. Overall guidelines and recommendations are likely 
only in rare cases to cause alterations to the information pool.  
At the same time recommendations contain no information about the policy of other member 
states from which a country could learn. First, deliberative learning with others presupposes a 
conviction that cooperation enables more successful problem solving. In view of the unrealistic 
goals of the Lisbon Strategy, the motivation for the individual to invest in an exchange of 
experience and common problem-solving should be limited (Zängle 2004). Second, guidelines
and recommendations set goals and impose concrete targets. While deliberative exchanges 
between actors are expected to produce new and better solutions, the guidelines are based on 
compromise between political actors. In brief, the European Commission is interested in 
greater quantification and concretisation of goals and obligatory reporting (Bruno 2008: 105). 
However, it is in the interests of member states to avoid specific commitments as much as 
possible. Empirical studies show that consultations on formulating guidelines have 
increasingly taken on the character of “interest-driven bargaining“ rather than “result open 
deliberation” (Jobelius 2003: 25; Radulova 2007: 374-5). Third, the growing substantive 
differentiation of guidelines into (partially) quantified, group-specific goals is at odds with the 
prerequisites for open learning processes. Finally, withh their ideologically stamped plea for 
the promotion of employability and a shift from passive to activating social security benefits, 
the EES is in substance leaning towards liberal and social-democratic welfare state models 
(Salais 2006). Whether this policy orientation is itself based on a learning process (for 
example, owing to the relative poor performance of corporatist-conservative regimes) or is to 
be explained in terms of (ideological) interests of the given governments or the Commission 
cannot be conclusively judged in this context. What is certain is that the guidelines reflect a 
specific steering intention – in contrast to open-ended learning processes (5).  
Overall, guidelines and recommendations appear not to be well suited to promoting learning 
processes. Relatively speaking, their greatest potential seems to be in inducing the expansion 
of actors’ own experience. But they do not make information about the policies of other
member states available. Unrealistic goals, uniform and increasingly concrete targets are likely 
to leave little scope for learning with others.  
Over and beyond learning, other transfer mechanisms offer explanations for change. In recent 
empirical studies changes become apparent where guidelines or recommendations are used to 
defend their interests against criticism at the national level (see Vanhercke this issue) or where 
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national actors to OMC guidelines and recommendations (Mabbett 2007: 88; Weishaupt this 
issue).  
4.2. National Reform Programmes   
On the basis of guidelines and recommendations, each member state draws up a National 
Reform Programme (NRP). Because NRPs are prepared at the national level, processes of 
learning with other national actors should be to the fore. The NRPs could prompt repetition of 
learning processes oriented on the European level between relevant actors. To this end they 
s h o u l d  b e  f o r m u l a t e d  i n  a  w i d e  c i r c l e  o f  major stakeholders, national parliaments, taking 
account of sub-national interests and with „active participation of civil society” (Ferrera et al. 
2002: 237).  
In practice, the circle of actors involved is small (Kröger 2007; Kerber and Eckardt 2007: 236). 
Research criticises a failure to involve the local level (Jacobbson and Schmid 2003: 117) and 
social partners (De La Porte and Nanz 2004: 279; even where social partner involvement in 
national policy making is traditionally strong, e.g. Sweden, Vifell 2004: 17). Moreover, 
responsibility for preparing NRPs is often entrusted to departments specialised in international 
policies. Work proceeds in relative isolation from the decisive arenas of national employment 
policy and overall strengthens the executive(s) (e.g. for Sweden: Vifell 2004: 14; on other 
OMCs Kröger 2006; Radulova 2007: 373-374). At the European level, too, the circle of actors 
involved is limited and, in comparison with the early years of the EES, an “intergovernmental 
drift” is apparent (Goetschy 2003: 88; Salais 2006: 201). What is important is that the limits to 
learning described are grounded in the interests of national governments, in their endeavours to 
retain control of the process. Other than in the case of guidelines and recommendations, 
criticism is levelled not at the design of the instrument but at how it is used and deployed in 
most member states. For this very reason, the challenge to learning through NRPs is posed not 
only by their discussion of learning potential under ideal conditions but also by their concern 
with (power) political interests (see Flear this issue).  
NRPs also have the potential to stimulate learning not only in the domestic arena but also with 
other member states at the European level. Here, too, assessment tends to be sceptical. One 
hope set in deliberative learning is that is can improve the basis for decision making through 
exchanges on future decisions and strategic planning. Although NRPs could in principle 
combine annual review and planning, they tend to be predominantly evaluative in nature, thus 
precluding their anticipation in their own policy decisions by member states.  
Analysis of the instrument shows that NRPs primarily seek to promote learning with others at 
the national level. A major obstacle is the factual limitation to the actors involved in 
formulation. To this must be added the evaluative nature of NRPs, which reduces the potential 
for learning with others at the European level.  
4.3. ‘Good practice’ benchmarking in the Annual Progress Report   
The Annual Progress Report (prior to 2005 Joint Employment Report) serves to evaluate 
labour market policies and their outcomes. In the report, the European Commission assesses 
NRPs, compares member states, emphasises good practice, and benchmarks member state 
labour market performance. The main object of the report is to exchange information and learn 
from others. Two forms of interaction are to be distinguished: Horizontal discussion among 
member states in the Council, where the European Commission is also present (Cambridge 
Process) and bilateral discussion among representatives of member states and the Commission. 
Horizontal exchange at meetings of the Council was originally restricted to less than an hour 
per country (Mosher and Trubek, 2003: 48). With the expansion and enlargement of the 
Council, NRPs are now discussed in four smaller working groups and summary results are 
© 2009 by Miriam Hartlapp
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2009-007a.htm 7presented in the plenum (Zeitlin, 2005: 489). The text of the report as adopted by the Council 
is available on the EES website. In 2005 a scoreboard was introduced, assessing the policy 
response of member states to each country-specific recommendation on an A to D scale: A 
(completed), B (in progress), C (limited), or D (incomplete).  
Bilateral exchange serves firstly to clarify issues and secondly, according to Casey and Gold 
(2005: 25) “to negotiate around any ‘recommendations’ that the report will contain.” This 
suggests that no learning processes are likely. Institutionalised horizontal exchange could 
facilitate learning from others. Although it seems unlikely that, in the brief period of formal 
exchange, decision makers can find “new solutions to problems often thought to be 
unsolvable” (Trubek and Trubek 2005: 93), the change in procedure in 2004 has continued to
enable individual discussion of NRPs offering more potential not only for discussing reform 
outcomes but also impact chains and conditions for reform.  
In the Progress Report, and more so in the scoreboards, bad performance is named (naming 
and shaming) and good performance praised (faming). The scoreboard allows member states’
policy successes to be directly compared and ranked. The scoring system recalls marks at 
school. A poor mark can amount to a communicative sanction “which can bring about real 
pressure on member states to change their policies” (Ashiagbor 2004: 315; Regent 2003: 210; 
Bruno 2008: 111).  
This could have two consequences. The establishment of competition in the context of 
benchmarking could induce member states to take account of new strategies for solving 
problems. From this point of view, ‘sporting competition’ would provide a positive framework 
for reactive learning at an individual level (cf. Benz 2008: 37-38). However, it can be objected 
that even without the EES, there would in principle be competition in employment policy 
performance. On the other hand, the incentive for member states to engage in (potentially) 
costly reforms to do better in the Progress Report is likely to be small. Another interpretation is 
that benchmarking seeks to steer behaviour by discrediting member states. This sort of 
competition is likely to worsen conditions for learning from others. If so the assessment that 
EES instruments create “trust and cooperation” and thus stimulate learning processes (Ferrera 
et al. 2002: 227) would not hold true. Where member states change policies only to avoid 
being at the bottom of the class, the transfer mechanism involved is pressure (cf. Lodge 2007). 
Dissonance between conditions necessary for stimulating learning – trust and the conviction 
that cooperation is of mutual benefit – and the competition engendered by direct comparison 
are weighty obstacles to learning.  
To judge conclusively the potential of Progress Report benchmarking for learning from others 
would require additional information on the selection criteria for the groups and on 
communication in the plenum. These factors influence whether horizontal exchange amounts 
to bargaining or deliberative problem-solving. Thus all that can be established at this point is
that there is a basic incentive to exchange information.  
Benchmarking in the Progress Report could serve to distinguish successful policies from those 
that are less successful, to select models (Regent 2003: 209) and to create coherent targets 
(mimesis, Trubek and Trubek 2005: 92). However, concentrating on single examples of good 
practice runs counter to the diversity of national policies (Scharpf 2002; Bruno 2008). This 
suggests, firstly, that certain models are suitable for all member states. Secondly, diversity is 
reduced and alternatives excluded. In complex fields like employment policy, various reform 
paths can lead to improved performance and attainment of EES goals even where problems are 
similar (equifinality). Benchmarking tends to suppress the necessary independent innovation 
and creativity that could provide responses to country-specific problems (Lundvall and 
Tomlinson 2001: 123). Thirdly, insufficient account is often taken of systemic contextual 
factors; incomplete or uninformed transfer can prove harmful and cause policies to fail (e.g. 
Kerber and Eckardt 2007: 234). Fourthly, best or good processual practices or strategies cannot 
as a matter of course be identified on the basis of outcomes (Arrowsmith et al. 2004: 320 and 
328). Finally, not all policies that today appear to solve problems will be successful in the long 
term and with sustainable impact (“lemming effect”, Lundvall and Tomlinson 2001: 123). In 
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others where the problems involved are technical – and not so much in complex matters like 
employment policy. 
4.4. Peer review   
Peer reviews were initiated in 1999 by the European Commission to stimulate learning from 
others through the exchange of good practices. Each country sends two representatives, a 
government representative and an independent expert; Commission officials also participate. 
The meeting lasts two days. Lectures and discussions on the policy example are mostly 
supplemented by a field visit, e.g. to a firm.  
Each year six examples are selected (in earlier years between 8 and 10). At the same time, 
thematic seminars are held under the umbrella of the Mutual Learning Programme. Focal 
topics are dealt with in a semi-annual cycle. A start is made with a thematic seminar.
Participation has been extended to include social partners and NGOs from the national and 
European levels. Finally, funding is available in connection with peer review for bilateral and 
multilateral follow-up activities, e.g. information events to pass on the knowledge gained at the 
EU level. With these reforms the instrument of peer review has on the whole improved the 
potential for learning from others as well as with others.  
The limits within which peer review can stimulate learning are set by the general difficulty of 
transferring successful problem-solving in a complex economic, social, and ideological
context. In empirical studies, Casey und Gold (2005) identify a number of institutional 
obstacles to the transfer of policies. Potential impediments include the lack of infrastructure for 
implementation, divergent legal systems (regulation by collective bargaining agreements or by 
legislation), the pattern of industrial relations (e.g. collective bargaining autonomy for the 
social partners or statutory minimum wage), social security systems (e.g. financing through 
taxes or contributions), and political structures. In a similar vein, Scharpf (2002) argues that 
learning processes can work only between countries with relatively similar, historically 
evolved institutional arrangements.  
This fundamental criticism can be mitigated in two aspects. First, the intention of peer review 
is not necessarily one-to-one transfer. In positive terms, it can serve to breach patterns of
thought and “to encourage poor performers to rethink their strategy” (Trubek and Trubek 
2005: 94). Secondly, criticism does not primarily address the conception of the instrument but 
its organisation. Member states can choose countries and topics that display similarities to their 
own, institutional structures, and actor constellations. If peer review provides more 
information on these factors and if the selection process were more strongly structured in this 
regard, the preconditions for learning could improve. The difficulty of transferring policies in 
complex fields with historically evolved institutions remains – especially when the political 
will is lacking. In sum, peer review offers only limited potential for promoting learning.  
4.5. Indicators   
Since 1997, performance indicators have been used in the EES context to facilitate evaluation 
of member state employment policy. Like guidelines, indicators have become more precise 
and numerous in the course of time. Key indicators (monitoring indicators) are used to 
measure the performance of labour markets with respect to prevention, activation, and 
employment, and to substantiate NRPs, for example, employment rates and long-term 
unemployment rates, as well as compatibility of work and private life. In parallel, context 
indicators (analysis indicators) permit better classification and evaluation of the key indicators 
of the given country, for example GNP growth, employment rate in full time equivalents or 
spending on life-long learning.  
Of the instruments under study, indicators seem to be best suited to stimulate learning 
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member states an incentive to rethink the causal connections between the expected impact of 
policies and the results of action, and, where necessary, systematically to record existing 
imbalances (Zeitlin 2005: 479). It is assumed that, in response to the newly generated 
knowledge, governments adapt their policies to take account of the changed information pool 
in seeking to attain an employment goal (simple learning). The positive influence on learning 
processes is expected to go beyond single indicators. Empirical studies stress the effect of the 
instrument at the institutional administrative level, for example, where the obligation to 
capture data induces member states to introduce or improve national structures for supervising 
the labour market, or where some member states exploit the indicators for the purpose of 
“tracking national policy targets – not only European ones” (Radulova 2007: 376). 
Furthermore, it is to be assumed that comparable indicators in different member states 
structure information, and are thus a precondition for learning with others and from others in 
the context of NRPs, benchmarking, and peer review (sceptical, based on empirical analysis 
Mabbett 2007; more optimistic Atkinson et al. 2004: 68).  
What indicators are recorded is decided each year by an expert group of the Employment 
Committee. De La Porte und Pochet (2004: 282) argue that an expert body is a better 
prerequisite for mutual learning than bodies dominated by political interests. However (final) 
decisions on indicators and their quality are made at the political level. Backdrop to the debate 
are both political positions and a conflict on competence between national governments and 
the European Commission (see Salais 2006: 205 on indicators „politically monitor[ing] the 
EES“). While these conflicts hamper learning processes that could be stimulated by the
instrument (cf. bargaining versus problem-solving), it shows that the role of indicators is not 
limited to the generation of information. Quantitative indicators help consolidate the OMC. If 
it is true that member states have so far supported the OMC “because of its low degree of 
legalization and its limited potential for unintended consequences” (Schäfer 2004: 13), this 
development is likely to produce tensions. Whether this concern of member states is justified 
cannot be conclusively decided on the basis of the research literature. There are certain signs 
that the OMC is used by the Commission to obtain consensus for central decisions (Scharpf 
2001). Similarly, the Commission could regard the OMC as an instrument for expanding 
competence. The OMC enables the Commission to act in policy areas where its scope for 
action has hitherto been restricted by the treaties or by persistent conflicts.  
Indicators stimulate learning through reflexive evaluation and targeted inducement to generate 
information. In comparison with the other EES instruments, the stimulation of learning in this 
case is less affected by inherent problems like the non-transferability of complex solutions to 
problems or the selection of particular models but it is affected by the very choice of 
indicators. However, political conflicts are emerging about the finalité of the OMC, which 
could hinder the optimum exploitation of the learning potential offered by indicators.  
5. Summary and recommendations for action   
The point of departure for this paper has been the growing prominence of the learning concept 
in the research literature and the wide-spread hope that instruments that can promote policy 
learning constitute a positive innovation and expansion vis-à-vis classical forms of regulation 
with all their limitations. At the same time, research into ‘learning’ in the context of the OMC 
and the EES shows methodological problems in the empirical analysis of causal connections, 
in taking due account of alternative internal and external explanations, and in establishing an 
analytical distinction between various transfer mechanisms. I have argued that these problems 
do not arise if analysis of learning in the EES context starts with the instruments employed. 
Without permitting conclusions to be drawn on the actual extent of learning, this approach 
enables the potential of the tools for stimulating learning to be addressed.  
The characteristics and processes of the steering tools used under the EES can foster various 
forms of learning and can vary in their potential for stimulating learning. If the design and 
processual application of an instrument is not suited to promoting learning, the steering effect 
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appear to be not well suited to stimulating learning processes. Relatively speaking, their 
greatest potential seems to be in inducing actors to enlarge their own experience. However, 
like other forms of learning, this is limited by the fact that guidelines and recommendations 
seldom alter the information pool, that goals are unrealistic and uniform, and that increasingly 
concrete targets leave little room for learning with others. National Reform Programmes are 
designed to foster learning with others in a deliberative process. However, the relevant sub-
national actors are very little involved at the national level in formulation and exchange 
processes. Benchmarking in the Progress Report aims to stimulate learning from others, but
focusing on only a few models and the decontextualised perspective call learning from others 
into question. The peer review instrument promotes potential learning from other member 
states. What limits learning is the difficulty of transferring policies in complex fields with 
historically evolved institutions. Finally, indicators stimulate learning through reflexive 
evaluation and targeted inducement to generate information. While indicators have the 
potential to promote learning through own experience, political conflicts about the 
consolidation of the OMC may in future hamper the optimum exploitation of this potential. 
Overall, the analysis on the basis of existing studies has shown that the potential of the EES 
instruments to stimulate learning is subject to considerable limitations.  
In some contexts these limitations could be eliminated (at least to some extent) by altering 
processes and characteristics. Learning through own experience could be further improved if 
indicators were more strongly geared to criteria developed by expert groups and researchers –
the downside being low political feasability and lack of democratic legitimacy. Nor is conflict 
about the consolidation of the method through the quantification of guidelines and indicators 
necessarily inevitable; it depends on the use the European Commission makes of the 
instruments as well as member state responses supported in turn by political majorities. The 
second form of learning, namely learning from others, could also gain potential from the 
modification of instruments. Greater process orientation and use of performance monitoring 
and case studies would enable loose but coherent steering (Arrowsmith et al. 2004: 325). Peer 
review should take place between groups of countries with similar institutional arrangements 
and structures. Policies in less problematic areas are likely to be more successfully transferred 
and changes more easily achieved through soft steering instruments, as well. Clusters, which 
could vary depending on the subject matter, could offer better conditions for learning from 
others. In general, the exchange of information can be promoted by greater transparency and 
the wider dissemination of the relevant documents among the actors affected. Finally, learning 
with others would be more likely if employment policy guidelines formulated realistic goals 
that could actually be attained through joint action (Zängle 2005). Deliberative learning 
processes would also benefit from changes in member state practices in preparing NRPs. The 
circle of actors involved should be extended and stabilised to include a broader group of sub-
national actors. Zeitlin (2005: 486) proposes using benchmarking not only for policy results 
and outcomes but also for measuring the broad involvement and relative influence of relevant 
actors (determining the nominal participation and the points in the NRP that substantively 
concern sub-national interests).  
However, this suggestion for stimulating deliberation through greater competition risks 
replacing learning processes by pressure to adopt policies. With respect to interaction between 
instruments and their compatibility, this constitutes the weightiest obstacle to stimulating 
learning processes through EES tools. The assumption was formulated at the outset that, where 
the steering intentions of different instruments contradict one another, this could reduce or 
neutralise the learning potential of EES as a whole. The underlying conditions for exchanges 
between countries in the sense of deliberative processes include similar or at least compatible 
interests, as well as trust, sustained relations between actors, and the conviction that 
cooperation in solving problems is to the benefit of all. These conditions are at odds with the 
interests of actors in situations that promote bargaining as an interaction mode. Benchmarking 
and (soft) sanctions seek to attain EES goals through competition between member states. The 
setting for learning with others is also negatively affected by the institutional context of 
increasing intervention by the highest political levels to influence operation of the OMC, the 
debates on consolidating the method, and political controversy about the quantification of 
goals. From a theoretical and abstract point of view, this tension arises from the contradiction 
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A positive aspect that should be noted is that learning through own experience stimulated by 
EES instruments appears to depend less on the interaction orientations of the actors involved 
(but see Horvath this issue). If the EES wishes to contribute to attaining employment policy 
goals through policy learning, this is the field that offers the greatest potential.  
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Endnotes  
(*) An earlier version of this paper was published as WZB Discussion Paper SP I 2006-114. Many thanks to 
Sandra Kröger, Armin Schäfer, Günther Schmid and an anonymous reviewer for valuable comments.  
(1) In contrast to Visser und Hemerijck (2001), I do not treat the OMC as a homogeneous instrument that 
promotes only one form of learning but look at each tool used seperately. 
(2) Taking this argument further, much of the literature on deliberative processes stresses the value of 
decisions taken under this approach as increasing democratic legitimacy for the OMC (e.g. Eberlein and 
Kerwer 2004). 
(3) Since 2005 the Employment Report forms one chapter within the overarching EU Annual Progress Report 
on the Lisbon Strategy.  
(4) Kröger (2006: 13) makes a similar argument about the (lack of) potential of OMC social inclusion NAPs 
and peer reviews to stimulate learning. Lodge (2007) stresses the high instrumental and contextual 
prerequisites of OMC pensions and information society to operate effectively. 
(5) A further point of criticism concerns the legitimation of this steering intention, seeking both new goals and 
a change in underlying standards and values (cf. Schäfer 2005: 219, Flear this issue). 
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